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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's 
March 12, 1993 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Review 
alleging entitlement to workers' compensation benefits sustained as 
a result of an industrial accident. A Petition for Review of that 
Order was timely filed with this Court on April 5, 1993. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Review 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 35-
1-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The only substantial issue presented for review is whether Mr. 
Draper's claim for permanent partial disability benefits is barred 
by the application of the ffgoing and comming11 rule. 
The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the 
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of 
error", since they involve questions of law, and no deference to 
the agency's view of the law is required. Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4) (d) 
(1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 
1991). Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope 
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize 
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to 
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compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner. State 
Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 
1984). McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 
1977). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45 is the determinative 
statute in this case. It is set forth in full in the Addendum 
thereto as Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Draper seeks review of the Industrial Commission Order 
denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to 
workers' compensation occasioned by his industrial accident. 
Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Draper filed an Application for Permanent, Partial 
disability compensation benefits sustained as the result of an 
industrial injury on or about January 15, 1991. (R. at 1). None 
of the parties disputed that Mr. Draper suffered an accident (R. at 
8); however, Respondents alleged that Mr. Draper's accident did not 
occur in the "course and scope of his employment11 and that he was 
precluded from benefits due to the application of the "going and 
coming rule". (R. at 19-24). A hearing was held on September 8, 
1992. (R. at 65). 
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Disposition Below 
On or about October 3, 1991, Applicant filed an Application 
for Hearing alleging that as a result of an industrial injury he 
was entitled to workers compensation benefits. (R. at 1). 
Defendant's moved to Dismiss on the basis that Applicant's claim 
was barred by the Statute of Limitations and that since he was 
injured while driving to work that pursuant to the "going and 
coming" rule, he was not eligible for workers compensation 
benefits. (R. at 19-25). 
A hearing was held on September 8, 1992 at which time certain 
medical records and affidavits were received. (R. at 68). The 
parties agreed to argue and obtain a ruling on the Motion to 
Dismiss prior to going forward with the Hearing (R. at 69). 
The Administrative Law Judge found that although the Applicant 
had not filed a workers compensation claim within 180 days of the 
accident, that his employer was aware of the accident and the 
circumstances surrounding it and thus held that his claim was not 
barred by the Statute of Limitations. (R. at 71). The 
Administrative Law Judge further found that the "going and coming 
rule" precluded recovery of workers compensation benefits for 
injures which occurred going to and from work off the premises of 
the employer because those actions were not considered to be "in 
the course of employment". (R. at 71). The Administrative Law 
Judge further found that there was "no evidence of any special 
hazard which the Applicant encountered to bring him within the 
special hazard exception". (R. at 74). 
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Defendants Motion to Dismiss was granted on the grounds that 
the accident did not arise out of or in the course of the 
Applicant's employment and his Application for Hearing was 
dismissed with prejudice (R. at 74-75, copy attached to Addendum as 
Exhibit B). 
He filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission on 
October 9, 1992 (R. at 76). On March 12, 1993 the Industrial 
Commission affirmed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order of the Administrative Law Judge and adopted it as its own. 
(R. at 115-126, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit C). 
Applicant challenges that final Agency action in this Petition for 
Review. (R. at 122-123). 
Statement of the Facts 
There is no argument between the parties as to the material 
facts. (R. at 116). The Applicant was driving to work in the early 
morning of January 15, 1991. It was a snowy morning, snow was 
falling, visibility was poor, and the roads were icy. (R. at 96). 
Mr. Draper was proceeding west along 700 South, which is a public 
road in Clearfield, Utah. He stopped to turn left onto Industrial 
Parkway, which leads to his place of employment. The Borden-Clover 
Club warehouse where Petitioner worked was approximately 7/10ths of 
a mile south down Industrial Parkway from the intersection. Only 
3/10s of a mile of Industrial Parkway is owned by the City of 
Clearfield, the rest of the Parkway road is gated off and owned by 
the parkway Industrial Complex. Petitioner testified that the 
route he had taken, was the only practical route he could take to 
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enter the private road to his employer. (R. at 51-52). 
About 500 feet further west, 700 South Street ends with a gate 
into the Freeport Center. At this time of the morning there is 
heavy traffic moving out of the Freeport Center going East on 700 
South because of a shift change. Mr. Draper was stopped at the 
intersection waiting for this traffic to clear so he could 
negotiate a left turn into the Industrial Parkway road, which is 
the only entrance into his place of employment. (R. at 51-52). 
Petitioner was rear-ended by Mr. Mumford while waiting on 700 
South to turn left. (R. at 116). Mr. Mumford states his vision 
was obscured by snow, and he slid on ice while trying to stop. (R. 
at 55). There were several raised train tracks crossing 700 South 
about 1/10th of a mile east of the intersection, as shown in the 
photographs and maps submitted by the Petitioner. (R. at 58-60). 
Mumford stated: 
I don't recall a train on the tracks, but I did look both 
ways while crossing the tracks. This is why I didn't see 
the car stopping ahead of me. The road is narrow and has 
no turn lane. (R. at 53). 
Mr. Mumford and the investigating officer agree "that the hazardous 
road conditions were the proximate cause of the accident." (R. at 
152-153). The Petitioner was severely injured as a result of that 
accident. (R. at 4-5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S) 
Petitioner's injures were sustained in the course and scope of 
his employment. Although incurred on the way to work, Petitioner's 
claim is not bared by the so called "going and coming rule1'. 
Petitioner provided substantial evidence of special hazards, i.e., 
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heavy traffic, (2) poor visability due to falling snow, (3) icy 
raods, and (4) raised railroad tracks. 
This Court should summarily reverse the Industrial 
Commission's determination that Petitioner's claim is barred by the 
"going and coming rule11 and remand with instructions to the 
Industrial Commission to convene a Medical Panel to examine the 
medical causation issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY 
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO 
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED 
WORKER. 
Few principles of workers' compensation law are as well 
established in this State as that workers' compensation disability 
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits, 
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor 
of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this 
principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 
796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); State Tax Commission v. Industrial 
Commission, supra., J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 
1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra.; Baker v. 
Industrial Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. 
Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission, 189 P. 2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, discussed the 
proper construction of the Workers' Compensation Act and the 
underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows: 
We are also reminded that our statute requires that 
the statues of this state are to be 'liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice.' 
* * * * * * 
In this connection it must be remembered that the 
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be 
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his 
dependents in case death supervenes. The right to 
compensation arises out of the relation existing between 
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of 
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act 
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or 
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to 
^employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the 
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the 
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as 
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are 
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs 
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the 
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such 
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those 
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or 
death to provide adequate means for the support of those 
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of 
total disability or death of the employee his dependents 
might become the objects of public charity, such a 
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or 
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right 
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the 
cost of producing and selling the product of such 
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such 
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason, 
if for no other, should receive a very liberal 
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are 
all united upon the proposition that in view of the 
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as 
the case may be. Id. at 1021-1022. (Emphasis added) 
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering his Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law failed to apply this vital rule of 
construction. Nowhere in his Findings or Conclusions is there any 
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evidence of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in 
favor of the claim". Rather the Administrative Law Judge and the 
Industrial Commission apply a strict construction of the law and 
resolve doubt against the claim. This case turns on the narrow 
facts of whether special hazards existed, which would take the case 
out of the purview of the "going and coming" rule. In determining 
that special hazards did not exist the Commission did not apply a 
"very liberal construction in favor of the injured worker", as 
required by case law. 
This principal of construction has special and recognized 
application to the "going and coming" rule. In a substantially 
similar case urging the existence of special circumstances to 
remove a case from the application of the "going and coming" rule, 
the Industrial Commission in Soldier Creel Coal Co. v. Baily, 
pointed out that: 
As counsel for the Applicant so aptly points out, when 
there are no decisive facts available in a case, the case 
should be analyzed in a light most favorable to the 
employee. 
* * * 
The workmen's compensation statute should be liberally 
construed in favor of injured workman and his dependents, 
and in case there is any doubt respecting the right to 
compensation, such doubts should be resolved in favor of 
his dependents. 
It is because of this presumption that the Commission 
feels that the Dependents of the Deceased Employee should 
be entitle to benefits. 
The entire underlying basis of the Order in this case, is thus 
flawed. The "findings" and "conclusions" do not evidence "humane 
and beneficent purposes" as required by law. The entire Order 
should be disregarded due to this conceptional flaw. 
& 
II 
THE "GOING AND COMING" RULE IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE DUE TO THE EXISTENCE OF SPECIAL HAZARDS. 
The general rule, sometimes referred to as the going and 
coming rule, is that an employee, having a fixed and limited place 
of employment, is not entitled to benefits under the workers' 
compensation act for injuries sustained while traveling to and from 
his place of employment. Posso Cherne Constr. v. Posso, 735 P. 2d 
384 (Utah 1987). While the employment may be the reason for the 
employee embarking on his or her journey between the home and the 
place of employment, it is a generally accepted proposition that 
the employee is not entitled to portal to portal coverage. Travel 
to and from work is not generally considered to be "in the course 
of ... employment." Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 8 P.2d 617, 618 (Utah 1932). 
Under the going and coming rule, travel between home and work 
is considered a personal activity since the employee typically 
performs services which benefit the employer only after his or her 
arrival at the place of employment; therefore, injuries occurring 
off the work premises during such travel are generally not 
compensable. Sokolowski v.Best Western Golden Lion Hotel, 813 P. 2d 
286 (Alaska 1991). Furthermore, the hazards encountered by an 
employee while going to or coming from the regular place of 
employment are not ordinarily incidental to the employment since 
the employee is exposed to dangers and risks to which all traveling 
persons are exposed. Doctor's Business Service, Inc. v. Clark, 
498 So. 2d 659 (Fla. App. 1986). 
There is, however, a recognized exception to the "going and 
coming" rule, which is known as the "special hazards exception". 
Professor Larson in his well respected treatise on workmen's 
compensation has stated the exception as follows: 
The commonest ground of extension [of the premises rule] 
is that the off-premises point at which the injury 
occurred lies on the only route, or at least on the 
normal route, which employees must traverse to reach the 
plant and therefore the special hazards of that route 
become the hazards of the employment. 1A. Larson, The 
Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 15.11 (1988). 
In order to qualify for this exception, the following 
requirements must be satisfied: (1) There must be a close 
association of the access way with the employer's premises, usually 
meaning that it must be the only route to the work-place; (2) there 
must be a special hazard associated with this route; (3) the 
employee must be exposed to the special hazard because of his use 
of the route; and (4) the special hazard must be the proximate 
cause of the accident. Soldier Creek Coal Company v. Bailey, 709 
P.2d 1165, 1166 (Utah 1985). 
A review of the evidence in this case reveals that Applicant 
satisfies all of those elements. 
A. THERE MUST BE A CLOSE ASSOCIATION OF THE ACCESS WAY WITH 
THE EMPLOYEES PREMISES. 
There can be little argument that Petitioner satisfies this 
element to the special hazard exemption. It is clear from the 
maps, diagrams, and pictures of the scene (R. at 152-157, copy 
attached to Appendix at Exhibit D), that this intersection where 
the car of Applicant was struck is virtually the only access way 
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into the employer's premises. All vehicles going into the Clover 
Club property approach exactly as Petitioner did, heading west on 
700 South. About 500 feet further West 700 South street ends with 
a gate into the Freeport Center. Petitioner's car was waiting at 
the intersection on 700 South, prepared to turn left onto Parkway, 
a private road leading to the Clover Club plant where he worked. 
The actual Clover Club plant is at the end of the private road 
about 1/2 mile from where the accident occurred. The private road 
is narrow and privately maintained. In fact, there is a gate 
across the road about 500 feet south of the intersection. 
Although there are two other businesses on the private road, 
the Associate Pipe building is now empty, and Unit Distribution 
building serves only a warehouse. The Clover Club facility is the 
principal business in the area and accounts for the vast majority 
of the automobile and truck traffic. The street coming from the 
north marked "Main Street11 is a very little used street. For all 
intents and purposes, the route taken by the Petitioner was the 
only true access route to his employers property and the work site 
he was required to report to. The accident occurred while he was 
turning onto the private road of his employer. 
In Bechtel Corp. v. Winther, 556 S.W.2d 282 (Ark. 1977), the 
employee was killed while driving to work from his home. His 
automobile had apparently left a causeway which cut across a lake, 
at a curve one-quarter of a mile from the plant's back entrance, 
and plunged into the lake, resulting in the employees death by 
drowning. The causeway was not the only access to the employer's 
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premises but was "regularly used" by two or three hundred employees 
to get to the premises. On the morning of the accident there was 
a low hanging fog, resulting in poor visibility. The Commission 
found that the death was compensable under the special hazards 
exception to the going and coming rule. The employer appealed 
arguing that the "close association of the access road to the 
premises" rule was not met because the accident occurred one-
quarter mile from the plant. The Arkansas Supreme Court disagreed, 
stating that the criterion for applying the exception is causal 
connection between the injury and employment, rather than sheer 
distance or proximity. 
Clearly there is a close association of the access way with 
the employers premises. Petitioner would have had no other purpose 
of being on that particular road other than obtaining access to his 
employers premises. The fact that 3/1Os of a mile of that road is 
publicly maintained does not disrupt the close association that 
access way has with the employer's premises. 
B. THERE MUST BE A SPECIAL HAZARD ASSOCIATED WITH THIS 
ROUTE. 
There were at least four special hazards in the present case 
which satisfy this requirement. They are: (1) Heavy morning 
automobile traffic moving to and from the Freeport Center and the 
Clover Club facilities; (2) Poor visibility from falling snow; (3) 
Icy roads covered with new snow; and (4) Raised railroad tracks 
with lifting traffic barriers within a few feet of the 
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intersection. 
Consistent with the liberal application of the workers 
compensation act, the Courts have found "special hazards" in a 
number of cases. In Diffendaffer v. Clifton, 430 P.2d 497 (Idaho 
1967), the employees were to meet in a certain town and were led to 
the job site by a foreman. On the way they traveled a dirt road 
and dust obscured their vision. While rounding a curve, the driver 
of the car claimant was in lost control of the vehicle, and 
claimant was severely injured in the resultant accident. The only 
hazard in this case was the existence of a dusty road and the cause 
of the accident was the driver losing control, never-the-less the 
Court held that the injury was compensable. 
The Florida Supreme Court in Narania Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, 
74 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1954) found an employee was forced to stop work 
because of heavy rain and decided to drive to a barbecue stand for 
coffee and shelter. While driving on an unimproved road adjacent 
to the company property, he ran into a tree. The road was the 
usual means of ingress and egress, but another exit was available 
at the opposite end of the premises. In awarding compensation the 
Court found the existence of special hazards and that the result 
was not changed by statutory language requiring that the injury 
occur both in the "course and scope of employment". 
It is clear from the evidence that the heavy traffic, reduced 
visibility, icy roads, falling snow and raised railroad tracks 
constituted special hazards which occurred uniquely at this 
particular location. Petitioner was exposed to special hazards due 
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to the requirements of his employment. 
C. THE EMPLOYEE MUST BE EXPOSED TO THE SPECIAL 
HAZARD BECAUSE OF HIS USE OF THE ROUTE. 
It must be remembered that Petitioner's accident occurred 
about 7:42 a.m. at a time when heavy traffic was moving into the 
Industrial Complex to commence work, and trucks were moving out to 
commence morning deliveries. Heavy traffic was moving in and out 
of the Freeport Center inasmuch as it was shift change time in the 
Center, and all this traffic was using 700 South street. It was 
principally the traffic moving out of the Freeport Center that 
caused Petitioner to be stopped waiting for traffic to clear enough 
to make a left turn into his employment location. The unusually 
heavy traffic at this particular location is what resulted in 
Petitioner having to come to a stop where he did. 
As Petitioner approached the turn, he noted a train was near 
the railroad crossing, and he looked back and noted the barriers 
had come down. He was the last car to cross the tracks. The car 
that rear-ended Petitioner came through the crossing after the 
barriers had lifted. Some idea of the amount of traffic blocking 
Petitioner's turn can be judged by the fact he was still waiting 
there to make his turn when the train passed and the barriers 
lifted. After the barriers had lifted, Mr. Mumford looked both ways 
as he crossed the tracks; he could see the Eastbound traffic but 
could not see Petitioner's car until he was on top of it. 
Obviously the automobile traffic, coupled with the railroad 
crossing and the tracks were distractions; poor visibility, the 
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rise in the track location made it difficult to see a stopped car 
only a few yards ahead. When Mr. Mumford observed the Petitioner, 
he applied his brakes but skidded on the ice, sliding into the 
Petitioner's car. 
Petitioner testified that he had tried to convince the Clover 
Club management to allow him to come to work a little later to 
avoid traffic, but he was told he would lose his job if he was not 
there at the required time. (R. at 53). It was the employers 
insistence that he be to work at the specified time, and that he 
use to only real available route which exposed him to the hazards 
which caused this accident. 
D. THE SPECIAL HAZARD MUST BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE 
OF THE ACCIDENT. 
There can also be little doubt that the special hazards 
existing that this particular site where the proximate cause of 
Petitioner's accident. If he had not been required to be at work 
at the exact same time as other employees and at the exact time of 
traffic moving in and out of the Freeport Center, then the accident 
would not have occurred and he would not have been injured. Both 
Mr. Mumford and Officer Kennephol stated f,that the hazardous road 
conditions were the proximate cause of the accident." (R. at 152-
157). The Defendants have presented no contrary evidence on this 
point. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the 
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its March 5, 1993 Order 
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dismissing Mr. Draper's claim for permanent, partial disability 
benefits for failure to prove an exception to the f,going and 
coming" rule. There were clear special hazards present in this 
case which removes it from the purview of that rule. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand 
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to either 
award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and medical 
evidence presented, or in the alternative, to convene a medical 
panel. 
DATED this 0^7 th day of September, 1993. 
ROBERT A. BENTLEY, ESQ^^ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Sharon J. Eblen, Esq. (2 copies) 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 South 300 East 
Post Office Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Steve Aeschbacher, Esq. (2 copies) 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
P.O. Box 545385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Mr. Richard Draper (1 copy) 
2043 East Leeway Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
File (1 copies) 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45 (1988). 
EXHIBIT B: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
(October 23, 1992). 
EXHIBIT C: Order Denying Motion for Review (March 12, 1993). 
EXHBIT D: Maps and diagrams of accident scene. 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and 
the dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident 
arising out of and in the course of his employment, wherever such 
injury occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted, 
shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of 
funeral expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility 
for compensation and payment of medical, nursing, and hospital 
services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under this 
chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not 
on the employee. (1988). 
Exhibit A 
STEVEN J, AESCHBACHER (A4527) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, .Utah 84145-Q385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION i 
ooOoo 
RICHARD DRAPER, : 
Applicant, : FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
V. : AND ORDER 
CLOVER CLUB, BORDEN and : 
CIGNA INSURANCE, Case No.: 91001100 
Defendants. 
ooOoo 
This matter came on for hearing pursuant to notice on 
September 8, 1992, at 8:30 A.M. The applicant was present, along 
with his counsel, Keith Sohm. Defendants were represented by 
their attorney, Steven J. Aeschbacher. Lamont D. Nelson of Clover 
Club was also present. Prior to taking testimony, a medical 
records exhibit was submitted, along with several affidavits 
submitted by the applicant. Defendants had no objection to the 
Affidavits of Officer Kennepohl and Mr. Mumford. The defendants 
raised several objections regarding the Affidavit of Richard 
Draper. They objected to his reference to Clover Club or Borden 
owning the road, Industrial Parkway, onto which he was turning, as 
00068 
Exhibit B 
without foundation. They further objected to the distances shown 
in Diagram "A", page 8, of the exhibit as inaccurate. Defendants 
proffered evidence that the distance from the railroad tracks to 
the intersection of 700 South and Industrial Parkway was 2/10ths 
of a mile, rather than l/10th of a mile as shown by the exhibit, 
and that the distance along Industrial Parkway from 700 South to 
the gate was 3/10ths of a mile, rather than l/10th of a mile as 
shown by Mr. Draper. Additionally, on page 10, Exhibit "D" of the 
exhibit, they objected to the way the Borden-Clover Club building 
was drawn on the map, and the applicant agreed that only the 
southern most portion of the building was present. With those 
objections and corrections, the affidavits and attached exhibits 
were admitted. 
The defendants moved to dismiss on two grounds. First, 
on the grounds that the statute of limitations barred the claims 
since no notice of an industrial accident was given within 180 
days of the accident to the employer or the Commission. Second, 
on the grounds that the employee was driving to work and, pursuant 
to the going and coming rule, was not eligible for worker's 
compensation benefits for this accident. The parties and 
Administrative Law Judge agreed to argue and rule on the motions 
to dismiss prior to going forward with the hearing. Issues raised 
by the impairment rating submitted by the applicant from Dr. Rich, 
and other questions regarding the period of TTD and the amount of 
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PPD, if any, available were not addressed in light of the 
dispositive nature of the motions to dismiss. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the following 
facts are found: 
The applicant was driving to work on January 15, 1991. 
It was a snowy day. The applicant was proceeding west along 700 
South, which is a flat, straight, public road in Clearfield, 
Utah. He slowed or stopped to turn left onto Industrial Parkway, 
which leads to his place of employment. The Borden-Clover Club 
warehouse where applicant worked was approximately 7/10ths of a 
mile down Industrial Parkway from the intersection. Industrial 
Parkway is owned and maintained by the City of Clearfield for the 
first 3/10ths of a mile heading south from 700 South, and is a 
public street. 
The applicant was rear-ended by Mr. Mumford while waiting 
on 700 South to turn left. Mumford claims he slid on ice while 
trying to stop. There were several train tracks crossing 700 
South some distance in excess of l/10th of a mile east of the 
intersection as shown in the photographs and maps submitted by the 
applicant. The applicant notified his employer that he had been 
in a car accident, but did not claim that it was work-related. In 
September, 1991, the applicant claimed for the first time that the 
accident was work-related or was industrially caused. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Even though the applicant did not file any worker's 
compensation claim or explicitly notify his employer that he 
thought he had an industrial injury within 180 days of his 
accident, his employer was aware of the accident and the 
circumstances surrounding it. Accordingly, this claim is not 
barred by the statute of limitations, and that aspect of 
defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. 
The applicant argues that the going and coming rule 
should not apply to this case because he encountered a "special 
hazard" on the way to work. It is argued that the special hazards 
were the fact that there was heavy traffic, that there were train 
tracks nearby, and there was snow and ice on the road. 
In general, the going and coming rule precludes recovery 
of worker's compensation benefits for injuries which occur going 
to and from work off of the premises of the employer because those 
actions are not considered to be "in the course of . . . employ-
ment." Soldier Creek Coal Company v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165, 1166 
(Utah 1985). The "special hazard" exception may apply if there is 
a close association of the access way with the employer's premises, 
there is a special hazard associated with the route, the employee 
is exposed to the special hazard with his use of route, and the 
special hazard is the proximate cause of the accident. Id. The 
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threshold, and dispositive, question in this case \s whether there 
was any special hazard associated with the route Mr. Draper took. 
The fact of train traffic on the train tracks which 
crossed 700 South some distance from the site of the accident is 
of no relevance and has no causal relationship to the accident. 
While perhaps if Mr. Draper had been hit by a train, this case 
would be more like the other train/special hazard cases, clearly 
this case is distinguishable and does not give rise to any such 
special hazard exception. The trains and tracks simply had 
nothing to do with this accident. There is no authority to 
support applicant's claim that heavy traffic is a special hazard 
within the meaning of the exception. Indeed, in Cherne 
Construction v. Possor 735 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that it was aware of no case authority to 
support a claim that "heavy traffic" was a special hazard. 
Finally, applicant claims that snow or ice on the roads 
creates a special hazard. In support of this, the applicant 
relies on two decisions of previous administrative law judges, 
Dewsnup v. Price River and Willson v. Emery Mining. Neither of 
those decisions is controlling, and both are distinguishable on 
the facts and the law. First, the law changed after both of these 
rulings to require that an accident both arise out of and be in 
the course of employment to be compensable. See Utah Code 
Annotated § 35-1-45 (1988, as amended). Previously, the definition 
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only required that the accident either arise out of or be in the 
course of employment. Since it is widely recognized that driving 
to and from work is not considered to be in the course of employ-
ment, the change in the law defeats the applicability of either 
case to this action. 
Additionally, the facts in those cases are significantly 
different from the facts here. In this case, the applicant was on 
a straight, flat road waiting to turn when a third party hit him. 
The third party blames the accident on sliding on the ice. By 
contrast, in the Dewsnup case, Case No. 81000575, the applicant 
was on the only access to the mine where he worked. The day 
before his injury he had been unable to get to work due to the bad 
conditions, and had to take a four-wheel drive vehicle to work at 
the beginning of his shift the day he was injured. On his way 
home, he had an accident when his car skidded on ice and hit 
railroad tracks which were adjacent and parallel to the road, 
which caused his vehicle to tip over and resulted in serious 
injuries to the applicant. The Dewsnup case seems to turn upon 
the involvement of the railroad tracks which caused his injuries. 
By contrast, here the railroad tracks had nothing to do with the 
accident. 
Similarly, in the Willson case, Case No. 84000311, the 
applicant was driving down a mountain road which was the only way 
in or out of his job site. The road had sharp curves on it and 
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subjected him to going in and out of the glare o«: the sun, which 
gave rise to the accident. The judge found at page 3 of the order 
that the injury arose out of his employment. The 1988 amendment 
to § 35-1-4 5 undermines the applicability of this case as well# 
since it clearly is not "in the course of" his employment. 
Additionally, the administrative law judge was not convinced that 
the applicant was off the employer's "premises" at the time of the 
accident. Moreover, the difference between a winding road going 
among canyon walls and trees which create glare and shadow is far 
different from a level, flat city street where this accident 
occurred. There is nothing dangerous about the route Mr. Draper 
took to work, and the transient fact that it was snowy on the day 
of his accident does not mean that his accident arose out of and 
in the course of his employment. The ice could have caused an 
accident at any point along his route to work, and the fact that 
it happened as he was nearing his destination (but had not reached 
it) does not make it compensable. 
There is no evidence of any special hazard which the 
applicant encountered to bring him within the special hazard 
exception. The car accident the applicant suffered did not arise 
out and was not in the course of the applicant's employment with 
Borden or Clover Club. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to 
dismiss is granted on the grounds that this accident did not arise 
out of or in the course of the applicant's employment. 
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• • • • 
t * • « 
Accordingly, the Application for Hearing is disnr.sred with 
prejudice. Any motion for review from this order must be made 
within 30 days of the date hereof or this will be treated as a 
final order of the Commission. 
DATED this day of <6 1992. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
CERTIFIED THISZ^DAY OF 
OCTOBER, 1992'. 
ATTEST: 
JPatricin 0 . Ashby I
 / 
Commission Secretafy-
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84114-6600 
RICHARD DRAPER, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
* 
CLOVER CLUB, BORDEN, and * 
CIGNA INSURANCE, * 
* 
Respondents. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) reviews the 
motion for review of the applicant in the above captioned matter, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-
46b-12. 
The provisions of U.C.A. Sections 35-1-1 et. seq. are 
applicable in this case. 
The order of the administrative law judge (ALJ) is presumed to 
be lawful and reasonable "until it is found otherwise in an action 
brought for that purpose, or until altered or revoked by the 
commission.11 U.CA. Section 35-1-20 (1953). 
The statutes further provide that: 
A substantial compliance with the requirements of 
this title [Title 35] shall be sufficient to give 
effect to the orders of the commission, and they 
shall not be declared inoperative, illegal or void 
for any omission of a technical nature. 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-33 (1953). 
The Commission has "the duty • • • and . • • full power, 
jurisdiction, and authority to. ... administer and enforce all laws 
for the protection of life, health, safety, and welfare of 
employees," U.C.A. Section 35-1-16(1)(a) (1953) , and to "consider 
and determine" the matters in issue, U.C.A. Section 35-1-24 (1953). 
Additional evidence that the Commission has been granted 
discretion in its determinations is shown by U.C.A. Section 35-1-88 
(1965) which provides: 
••.The commission may make its investigation in 
such manner as in its judgment is best calcula-
ted to ascertain the substantial rights of the 
DENIAL OF MOTION 
FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 92000425 
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parties and to carry out justly the spirit of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
The preceding statute relates to matters at hearings, and 
shows the extent to which the legislature desired to provide the 
Commission with the necessary discretion to reach a decision. This 
statute also provides the authority for the Commission to deviate 
from common-law rules, statutory rules of evidence, technical or 
formal rules of procedure, unless provided for in the Worker's 
Compensation Act, or unless otherwise adopted by Commission rules. 
Id. 
Thus, the statutes expressly and impliedly give the 
Commission, commensurate with its statutory duty, broad authority 
and discretion to interpret, construe, consider, and determine the 
matters before it in the workers' compensation arena. 
The applicant timely filed his motion for review of the ALJ's 
order of October 23, 1992. The findings of fact will be set forth 
since there appears to be no argument between the parties as to the 
material facts. The dispute in this motion for review revolves 
around whether the applicant was within an exception to the "going 
and coming" rule when he was injured while driving his automobile 
to work. 
The applicant was driving to work on January 15, 1991. It was 
a snowy day. The applicant was proceeding west along 700 South, 
which is a flat, straight, public road in Clearfield, Utah. He 
slowed or stopped to turn left onto Industrial Parkway, which leads 
to this place of employment. The Borden-Clover Club warehouse 
where the applicant worked was approximately 7/10ths of a mile down 
Industrial Parkway from the intersection. Industrial Parkway is 
owned and maintained by the City of Clearfield for the first 
3/10ths of a mile heading south from 700 South, and is a public 
street. 
The applicant was rear-ended by another car driven by Mr. 
Mumford while the applicant was waiting on 700 South to turn left. 
Mr. Mumford claimed that he slid on ice while trying to stop. 
There were several train tracks crossing 700 South some distance in 
excess of l/10th of a mile east of the intersection as shown in the 
photographs and maps submitted by the applicant. The applicant 
notified his employer that he had been in a car accident, but did 
not claim that it was work-related. In September 1991, the 
applicant claimed for the first time that the accident was work-
related. 
The ALJ concluded as a matter of law that the applicant's 
claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, and was timely 
filed. Further the ALJ determined that the going and coming rule 
001.16 
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applied in this case, and that there were no special hazards which 
created exceptions to the rule. As a result, he ruled that the 
applicant's injury was not industrially related. 
The applicant alleges in his motion for review that there were 
at least four special hazards in the present case that would 
justify recovery. He named these hazards as: (1) Heavy morning 
automobile traffic moving to and from the Freeport Center and the 
Clover Club complex; (2) poor visibility from falling snow; (3) icy 
roads covered with new snow; and (4) raised railroad tracks with 
lifting traffic barriers within a few feet of the intersection. 
The going and coming rule precludes recovery of workers' 
compensation benefits for injuries which occur while going to or 
from work off of the premises of the employer because those actions 
are not considered to be Min the course of ... employment." 
Soldier Creek Coal Company v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Utah 
1985). The "special hazard" exception may apply if there is a 
close association of the access way with the employer's premises, 
there is a special hazard associated with the route, the employee 
is exposed to the special hazard by his use of the route, and the 
special hazard is the proximate cause of the accident. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that it was aware of no 
authority to uphold a claim based upon "heavy traffic" as a special 
hazard. Cherne Const, v. Posso. 735 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1987). 
Additionally, the train traffic on the tracks some distance from 
the site of the accident had no causal relationship to the 
accident, and is not relevant to this inquiry. This disposes of 
two of the alleged special exceptions. 
The remaining claimed special exceptions both deal with 
adverse weather conditions, visibility and icy roads. To support 
these exceptions, the applicant provides us with two opinions 
issued by the Commission. Dewsnup v. Price River Coal Co.. Case 
No. 81000575; Willson v. Emery Mining Corp.. Case No. 84000311. 
Unfortunately, both cases were decided after the law was changed to 
require that an accident arise out of and be in the course of 
employment in order to be compensable. U.C.A. Section 35-1-45 
(1953 as amended 1988). Under the less restrictive prior law upon 
which Dewsnup and Willson were based, the applicant only had to 
show either of the prongs. Currently, the applicant must show both 
that his injury arose out of his employment, as well as that he was 
in the course of employment. 
The words "arising out of" as used in Section 45 refer to the 
origin or the cause of the injury, whereas words "in the course of" 
refer to time, place and circumstances under which it occurred. 
Utah Apex Mining Co. v. Ind. Comm'n, 67 Utah 537, 248 P. 490, 49 
A.L.R. 415 (1926). Since there is no statutory definition of the 
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term "in the course of employment, •• the legislature intended the 
ordinary meaning under the common law. Utah Copper Co. v. Ind. 
CgmmjMn, 62 Utah 33, 217 P. 1105, 33 A.L.R. 1327 (1923). 
Although it is not immediately clear whether there is a 
distinction between "arising out of" as contrasted with "in the 
course of," the Supreme Court has informed us that an accident 
arising out of employment has a more definite and closer causal 
relationship than is necessary for the latter. M & K Corp. v. Ind. 
Commin, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (1948). In the "course of 
employment," apparently requires that the employee render service 
to the employer which the employee was required to do, or to do 
something incidental to the employment at a time and place where 
the employee was authorized to render such service. Id. 
Ordinarily, an employee is deemed not to be within the course of 
his employment if he furnishes his own transportation and is 
injured while going to or from the place where he is employed. 
Barney v. Ind. Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 179, 506 P.2d 1271 (1973). 
As we understand the facts, the applicant was on a public 
street (700 South) waiting to turn into Industrial Parkway which is 
also maintained by the City of Clearfield for approximately 3/10 of 
a mile. Under the circumstances, the location cannot be considered 
to be on or near the employer's premises. The applicant admits 
that there is another route into the location named "Main Street" 
which is a little used street. Under the circumstances, we cannot 
say that the route taken by the applicant was the only route which 
could be used. 
The whole purpose of the special hazard exception is to impose 
on employers the risk of hazards which are not generally 
experienced by the public, and are peculiarly related to the 
employment within the scope of workers' compensation. At the same 
time, there is an intent to exclude hazards to which the general 
public is also exposed. In this instance, there is nothing to show 
that either the snow in the air, or the snow and ice on the ground, 
were any special hazards peculiar to the applicant's employment 
with the respondents. 
For all the above reasons, we affirm the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and order, and adopt them as our own. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated October 23, 1992 is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date of the order, pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53 (2) , 35-1-86, 63-46b-16, 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, Benjamin A. Sims, certify that I did mail by prepaid first 
class postage, except as noted below, a copy of the Denial of 
Motion for Review in Draper v. Clover Club et al.. Case Number 
92000425, on /JL March 1993 to the following: 
Keith E. Sohm, Atty. 
2057 East Lincoln Lane 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Richard Draper 
2043 Leeway Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Steven Aeschbacher, Atty. 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law Judge 
(intra office mail) 
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and Couriers v. Dep/t of Empl. Sec, et al.. Case No. 920621-CA 
(Utah App. December 4, 1992). The requesting party shall bear all 
costs to prepare a transcript of the Rearing for appeals purposes, 
Stdphen M. Hadley 
Chairman 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
^*t£L^ V^^S^ 
A-^ Certified th i s \ ^ L day of^TAcwJ 
ATTEST! V~ 
xolleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
1993. 
:
& . 
Patricia 0. Ashby 
Commission Secretary 
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Showing 4 RR track crossing 
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#4 Gate on Industrial P kwy looking 
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leading to Bordens Clover Club 
